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Abstract: this paper addresses the following questions: which was the contribution of banks’ 
assets to the US’ expansion in the period until the financial crisis? Did commercial banks respect 
capital requirements? The two questions are strictly interrelated as, according to a recent literature, 
business cycle is directly related to banks’ capital requirements for market and credit risk. The analysis 
highlight that US commercial banks actually respected capital requirements but these were not 
relevant in the explanation of US growth; it confirms that most of the growth can instead be explained 
by the rise in productivity. 
Nevertheless, the analysis does not consider the role of the non banking intermediation 
(investment banks, broker dealers, mutual funds, etc.) that steadily increased until the crisis. Its effects 
over real economy could be investigated in further work.  
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Introduction 
 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis developed in the US financial system and then it spread 
in all the developed countries, hitting their banking and financial systems and severely hurting 
real economies. Banks – especially U.S. banks – have been blamed of the excessive increase 
of assets and credit that created the conditions for the subsequent turmoil. Nevertheless, 
banks’ leverage increase should be limited by the amount of available capital and by the need 
to guarantee a fixed ratio between capital and assets, as stated by banking regulation. In 
particular, from the introduction of the first Basel Accord, the ratio of a bank's capital to its 
risk-weighted assets (i.e. the total capital ratio) must be no lower than 8% (weights reflect the 
presumed degree of risks associated to that kind of assets).  
This paper tries to analyze the interrelation between real and financial variables in US, 
attempting to answer to the following questions: was the capital requirements’ constraint 
really binding for the US commercial banks? Did the increase in banks’ assets significantly 
contribute to US expansion in the real sector and in the financial markets until the crisis?  
These two questions are strictly interconnected as, according to a recent literature, 
business cycle is directly related to banks’ risk based capital requirements for market and 
credit risk. Any negative macroeconomic shock that increases risks and produces capital 
losses would require less capitalized banks to raise new capital in order to respect the capital 
ratios. If banks cannot easily increase their capital because of frictions in capital markets, they 
tend to cut assets by selling securities and reducing loans provision to respect capital 
requirements: this behaviour amplifies the effects of downturns in the real and financial 
world. The opposite happens during expansions.  
The estimates in the paper show that banks actually respected capital requirements, 
targeting a constant leverage ratio: it is shown that assets and capital shared a lung run 
relationship since the introduction of capital requirements. Nevertheless, banks’ variables do 
not seem to be relevant in explaining either US’ business expansion until the crisis or the rise 
in financial markets; the analysis testifies instead the importance of the increase in total factor 
productivity as a source of growth. 
The paper concentrates on banks, but further work could try to evaluate the role of the 
non banking intermediation (investment banks, broker dealers, mutual funds, etc.) over 
business cycle, i.e. if the non banking intermediation increase (that was considerable until the 
crisis) can help explain the U.S. expansion until the financial crisis. 
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The paper is organized as follows: section 1 offers a review of the literature about the 
interaction between real and financial variables; section 2 describes the effects of capital 
requirements on real economy; section 3 introduces the econometric model and the data; 
section 4 is devoted to understand if US commercial banks actually respected capital 
requirements from their introduction until the crisis; sections 5 and 6 model the capital 
requirements transmission channel to the real economy, making recourse to a structural 
cointegrated vector error correction model (VECM); in section 6 the effects of banks’ 
variables over real ones are analyzed  by the impulse response functions; the last section 
concludes. 
1. Related literature 
Since the 1929 Great Depression the economic theory has tried to explain the interaction 
between financial variables and real economy. The beginning of this literature can be ideally 
fixed in 1933 with Fischer’s (1933) debt-deflation theory. At that time Fischer recognized the 
role  of over-indebtedness (in one or more sectors of the economy) and deflation as the main 
reasons giving rise to great depressions (“the more the debtors pay the more they owe”); 
according to this theory, other factors like over production or under consumption or over 
capacity play a secondary role.  
During the 2007-2008 financial  turmoil, Minsky’s financial instability hypotheses1 
has been seen as able of explaining what was happening,  so that some economists refer to the 
financial crisis as a “Minsky moment”2. Like in the debt-deflation theory, in Minsky’s idea, a 
capitalist economy becomes more and more fragile during a period of growth and low interest 
rates that induce over-indebtedness: in a period of growth, enterprises in profitable sectors of 
the economy register high returns by increasing the amounts of debt; their success and high 
profits expectations encourages others to take the same behaviour in the same area. The rise in 
the debt moves the economy or a sector of the economy from the hedges finance to the 
speculative finance, ending in the Ponzi finance. Hedge finance is characterized by most 
borrowers being able to pay back interests and principal of their loans; in the speculative 
                                                 
1  This section is based on the following papers and books by Minsky H. P.:  
 “Private Sector Asset Management and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice”, The Journal of Finance, 1969; “Central 
Banking and Money Market Changes”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1957; “Financial Crises: Systemic or Idiosyncratic”, The 
Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 51, 1991; “The Capital Development of the Economy and The 
Structure of Financial Institutions”, The Jeromc Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 72, 1992; “Uncertainty and 
the institutional structure of the capitalist economies”  The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 155, 1996;  
“John Maynard Keynes”. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975;  Can “It” Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance”. 
Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1992;  “Stabilizing an Unstable Economy”. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986;  “Reconstituting 
the United States’ Financial Structure: Some Fundamental Issues.”Working Paper No. 69. The Levy Economics Institute. January, 1992; 
“The Financial Instability Hypothesis.” Working Paper No.74. The Levy Economics Institute.May, 1992. 
2 Whalen (2007). 
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finance most borrowers can just pay interests, so they have to roll over the financing; finally 
in the Ponzi case, companies must borrow to pay both interests and principal. The Minsky 
moment arises when companies cannot rollover their debt anymore and begin selling their 
assets; it is endogenously produced within the economy: the economic cycle is neither 
generated by an exogenous shock nor by a technological shock but, essentially, by the 
propensity of people to assume increasing risks. The subsequent process is very fast: the price 
of the assets falls down and credit suddenly dries up, leading investment, output and 
employment to decrease sharply.  Lower instability can be reached with significant contra-
cyclical government deficit, which aims at stabilizing profits (as private investment declines 
in recession) and with an accommodative and interventionist monetary policy, when 
instability emerges from financial markets. 
The financial accelerator models emphasize instead the importance of the value of 
the guarantees the borrowers can offer; they show how lending and spending - and 
consequently the business cycle - can depend on changes in the warranties value. 
Bernanke et al. (1998) develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in the context 
of dynamic new Keynesian economics that incorporates growth, money, monopolistic 
competition and nominal rigidities. They also incorporate credit-market frictions that 
endogenously amplify and propagate real effects of nominal shocks, even small shocks. The 
mechanism described involves the link between “external finance premium” (that is to say the 
difference between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds 
internal to the firm) and the net worth of potential borrowers (i.e. borrowers’ liquid assets plus 
collateral value of illiquid assets less outstanding obligations). The “external finance 
premium” depends inversely on borrowers’ net worth as the lower borrowers’ wealth to 
contribute to the project, the higher the agency costs (the cost of observing the borrower’s 
realized return); in equilibrium the lenders must be compensated for higher agency costs by a 
larger premium. As borrowers’ net worth is pro cyclical, like profits and assets prices, the 
external finance premium is countercyclical, enhancing the cyclicality in borrowing, 
investment, spending and production.   
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a model of a dynamic economy in which 
lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless debts are secured by durable assets 
such as land, buildings and machinery. These assets also represent factors of production. 
Borrowers credit limits are affected by the prices of collateralized assets. At the same time, 
these prices are affected by the size of the credit limits. The dynamic interaction between 
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credit limits and asset prices turns out to be a transmission mechanism by which the effects of 
shocks persist, amplify and spill over other sectors, allowing small, temporary shocks to 
generate large and persistent fluctuations in output and assets prices. They assume there are 
two types of firms: credit constrained ones are highly levered; they borrowed heavily against 
the values of their assets, whose total supply is fixed (like land); while others are credit 
unconstrained. If a temporary shock reduces firms’ net worth, credit constrained ones are 
forced to cut back on their investment expenditure in assets; this hurts them in the next period 
as they earn less, their net worth falls, they can borrow even less and their investment reduces 
even more, and so on for next periods. For the market to clear, the demand for the assets from 
the unconstrained firms must increase, that is to say their user cost has to fall. This happens as 
they correctly anticipate the decline in user costs in the following periods. The fall in the 
assets price produces a capital loss to constrained firms that reduces their net worth even 
more, giving rise to deeper cuts in investments.  
Iacoviello (2005) model adds to Bernanke et al. two features: collateral constrains 
tied to real estate values for firms, like in Kiyotaki and Moore, and nominal debt, as almost all 
debt contracts are in nominal terms. In this context a positive demand shock let consumer and 
assets prices to increase, rising the borrowing capacity of the debtors, allowing them to spend 
and invest more. The rise in consumer prices reduces the real value of their outstanding debt 
obligations, positively affecting their net worth. Given that borrowers have a higher 
propensity to spend than lenders, the net effect on demand is positive and acts as a powerful 
amplification mechanism. The financial accelerator depends upon where the shock comes 
from: the model features an accelerator of demand shock and a decelerator of supply shock, as 
adverse supply shock are beneficial to borrowers’ net worth if obligations are held in nominal 
terms. 
The financial accelerator models so far described underline the importance of 
constraints on the demand side of credit (the guarantees offered by the borrowers); more 
recently, the economic literature has highlighted the role of constraints on the supply side as a 
source of business cycle fluctuations.  Gerali et al. (2010) extend the model in Iacoviello by 
introducing a stylized banking sector with imperfect competition and endogenous capital 
accumulation. They study the role of credit supply factors in business cycle fluctuations using 
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with financial frictions and with an 
imperfectly competitive banking sector. Banks issue collateralized loans to both households 
and firms, obtain funding via deposits, and accumulate capital out of retained earnings. Loan 
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margins depend on the banks’ capital-to-assets ratio and on the degree of interest rate 
stickiness. Balance-sheet constraints establish a link between the business cycle, which affects 
bank profits and thus capital, and the supply and cost of loans. They find that the banking 
sector and, in particular, sticky rates attenuate the effects of monetary policy shocks, while 
financial intermediation increases the propagation of supply shocks; shocks originating in the 
banking sector explain the largest share of the contraction of economic activity in 2008, while 
macroeconomic shocks played a limited role; finally an unexpected destruction of bank 
capital may have substantial effects on the economy. 
The effects coming from banks’ balance sheets and capital requirements on real 
economy are more specifically analyzed in the new financial accelerator model developed by 
Adrian and Shin (2010). In this context, the business cycle is seen as directly related to banks’ 
risk based capital requirements for market and credit risk. During expansions, banks tend to 
accumulate risk, but during contractions risks show up because risk itself is counter-cyclical. 
Adrian and Shin underline the relationship between banks’ balance sheet and financial 
markets: changes in assets prices immediately produce changes in banks’ balance sheets if 
these are marked to market, having an impact on the net worth of all financial firms (NW, i.e. 
equity for firms, represented by the difference between asset and liabilities: A-L). 
They demonstrate how market and credit risk models used by banks to determine 
capital requirements can induce pro cyclicality in financial markets and consequently in the 
real economy. Leverage is defined as the ratio between total asset A and net worth NW 
(A/NW=A/(A-L)) and it is strongly positively related to changes in balance sheet: if firms 
were passive to asset prices fluctuations an increase in asset prices would immediately 
produce a decrease in leverage as the denominator would increase more than the numerator. 
Examining data for the period 1963 to 2006, they find instead strong evidence that financial 
firms actively manage their balance sheet: commercial banks target a fixed leverage ratio, 
while security dealers and brokers and investment banks show a positive relationship between 
assets and leverage3. That is to say, investment banks respond to a rise in asset prices by 
expanding their balance sheets and increasing liabilities more than assets rise, the opposite 
happens when assets value diminishes. The reason why investment banks show pro cyclical 
                                                 
3 The analysed investment banks are: Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Today, there are 
not stand alone investment banks in Wall street. The former three of them were under distressed conditions or declared bankruptcy. The other 
two were converted into bank holding companies. 
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leverage is related to their risk models and capital requirements that impose a fixed ratio 
between the total value at risk (VaR) of their assets and equity4.   
US commercial banks instead showed a roughly constant leverage. This behaviour is 
explained by Adrian and Shin with the need to maintain fixed capital requirements for credit 
risk. As assets in these banks are traditionally represented mostly by loans, commercial banks 
are more subject to capital charges for credit risk than for market risk. In a period of recession 
losses produce a reduction in capital; as they face capital market frictions, banks tend to 
reduce assets to respect capital requirements, maintaining leverage fixed; assets reduction 
produces a pro cyclical movement both in loans and assets prices that feeds back to the 
economy.  
In contrast with Adrian and Shin’s, some analyses find that capital ratio shocks are not 
very important in determining loan growth. Berrospide et al. (2010) repeated Adrian and 
Shin’s leverage analysis for US commercial banks starting in the early 1990s (instead of 
1963) to reflect the significant structural changes in banking coming from the adoption of 
Basel I in the U.S. and the consequences of loan market deregulation (which began in the 
early 1980 in many advanced economies5). In contrast with the prevailing view, they found 
much less evidence of commercial banks maintaining constant leverage ratios in later sample 
period. They also examined the response of loan growth to a capital ratio shock and found 
results in contrast to the constant leverage view, which predicts changes in loan growth on the 
order of six to fifteen times larger; the role of other factors such as economic activity and 
banks’ perception of borrower riskiness seemed to be more important than capital. 
2. Capital requirements and their effects on the real side of the economy 
Banking regulation greatly relies on banks’capital: banks are required to maintain an 
adequate level of internal financial resources relative to assets’size and riskiness, to afford 
eventual losses and to avoid banks’ moral hazard; capital also contributes to limit the risks 
taken by banks. 
The introduction of banks’ capital requirements comes back to 1988, when Basel I, the 
international accord to bank capital regulation, was introduced. It prescribed a minimum 
solvency ratio equal to 8% between capital and the sum of banks’ risk-weighted assets. Risk 
                                                 
4 Value at Risk (VaR) is a widely used risk measure of the risk of loss on a portfolio of financial assets. For a given portfolio, probability and 
time horizon, VaR is defined as a threshold value such that the probability that the mark-to-market loss on the portfolio over the given time 
horizon exceeds this value (assuming normal markets and no trading in the portfolio) is the given probability level.  
5 See IMF World Economic Outlook April 2008 p.104 
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weights were fixed per each asset category according to the presumed degree of risk (the 
weights were 0% for sovereigns, 20% for banks, 50% for mortgage loans, 100% for all other 
loans such as loans to firms and households) 6.  
The second of the Basel Accords on banks’ capital adequacy, Basel II, was issued by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision7 and initially published in June 2004. Basel II was 
directed at improving the consistency of banks’ capital regulation internationally, make 
regulatory capital more risk sensitive and promote enhanced risk-management practices 
among large, internationally active banking organizations. Like the previous Basel I accord, it 
states a minimum capital requirement for banks of 8% of banks’ risk weighted assets, but 
weights are not fixed and can be determined in two different ways. In the so called 
standardised approach, banks may use credit risk valuations of credit rating agencies8, while 
supervisors are responsible for deciding the correspondence between rating agencies’ 
assessment categories and risk weights. Alternatively, banks can choose the internal rating 
methodology for calculating their capital requirements for credit risk: this approach is subject 
to the explicit approval of the bank’s supervisor and allows banks to use their internal rating 
systems; it is known as internal rating-based (IRB), in two version: foundation or advanced.  
Banks’ capital requirements can have important real effects and can amplify the 
business cycle. They essentially impose banks to maintain a fixed ratio between capital and 
risk weighted assets; as a consequence, the amount of capital represents a limit to loans’ 
provision. In other terms, capital – together with funding - represents for the banks a sort of 
raw material to offer loans and expand assets: the higher the level of capital, the bigger the 
impulse that banks can give to the economy and financial markets, via loan provisions and 
securities acquisitions.  
Any negative macroeconomic shock that increases risks and produces capital losses 
would require less capitalized banks to raise new capital in order to respect the capital ratios. 
If the market for capital were frictionless, banks would not encounter any difficulty in rising 
new capital and maintaining the same level of assets. If instead banks cannot easily increase 
their capital because of frictions in capital markets, they tend to deleverage, selling securities 
and reducing loans provision in order to respect capital requirements: this behaviour amplifies 
the effects of downturns in the real and financial world. The opposite happens during 
                                                 
6 Banca  D’Italia Occasional paper n.44, 2009. 
7 It is available in the Bank for International Settlement web site. 
8 These rating agencies (known as External Credit Assessment Institutions) are recognised as eligible for capital purposes by national 
supervisors in accordance with the criteria defined in the Accord. 
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expansions where financial intermediaries hold surplus capital; they expand assets offering 
new loans and through new securities purchases. The described mechanism works under both 
the first and the second Basel Accord as both of them essentially prescribe a fixed level of 
leverage, i.e. a constant ratio between assets and capital9.  
In the following, these aspects will be analyzed in more detail, modelling the 
transmission channel from commercial banks’ balance sheets to real economy. The analysis 
can be ideally divided in twos:  
1. The next section concentrates on capital requirements, trying to understand if US 
commercial banks targeted a constant leverage from the introduction of the first Basel 
Accord. This would imply that commercial banks actively managed their assets in 
order to maintain a constant capital to assets ratio (or capital ratios), deleveraging 
during downturns and expanding loans and other assets in upturns;  
2. Then the transmission channel from banks balance sheets to real economy is 
modelled, through a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) that takes into account 
real variables together with financial ones.  
3. The data and the empirical model 
The model consists of 7 variables: product (Y), consumption (C), investments (I), assets 
(A) and capital (K) for commercial banks, the s&p index (SP), the fed fund rate (F). Data 
have been collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis web site. They refer to: 
- gross national product (Y), gross private domestic investment (I), personal consumption 
expenditures (C), seasonally adjusted; they have been expressed in real terms dividing by 
the implicit price deflator of the gross national product (in billions of dollars); 
- the effective fed fund rate (F) in percentage. The federal fund rate is the interest rate at 
which private depository institutions (mostly banks) lend balances (federal funds) at the 
Federal Reserve to other depository institutions, usually overnight. The interest rate that the 
borrowing bank pays to the lending bank to borrow the funds is negotiated between the two 
banks, and the weighted average of this rate across all such transactions is the federal funds 
                                                 
9 The new Basel III Accord, issued by the Basel Committee in 2010-2011 but not yet implemented, addresses the issue of pro cyclicality of 
capital requirements introducing two new capital buffers: a "mandatory capital conservation buffer" of 2.5%, aimed at ensuring that banks 
maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress, and (ii) a "discretionary 
counter-cyclical buffer", which would allow national regulators to require up to another 2.5% of capital during periods of high credit growth 
with the purpose of achieving the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit 
growth. 
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effective rate10; as the Federal Reserve uses open market operations to influence the supply 
of money in the U.S. economy  to make the federal funds effective rate follow the federal 
funds target rate, this variable can represent both the policy rate and the conditions of the 
interbank market of funds; 
- seasonally adjusted assets (A) of all commercial banks (in nominal terms, millions of 
dollars); 
- capital (K, assets less liabilities) of all U.S: commercial banks (in nominal terms, million of 
dollars). Strictly speaking this series represents banks’ net worth but I will refer to it simply 
as capital (K); 
- the Standard & Poor’s 500 US index at the end of any quarter (SP); this series has been 
collected by Bloomberg’s. It contains the prices of 500 large-cap common stocks actively 
traded in the United States and is incorporated into the model to take into account the 
effects of the banks’ variables on financial markets. To express this variable in real term, it 
has been divided it by the implicit price deflator of the gross national product. 
All the series are quarterly observations; they have been transformed in dollars and 
then in natural logarithm; the fed fund rate has been divided by one hundred and summed to 
one before the logarithmic transformation as it was initially expressed in percentage points.  
The setting for modelling the real sector will be that of the Real Business Cycle 
Theory11, according to which product, consumptions and investments show the same long run 
growth process induced by the growth rate of the total factor productivity. Real Business 
Cycle Theory allows taking into account an important source of U.S. growth in the period 
under consideration - the technological shock - on which there is general consensus12. This 
theory accepts the complete irrelevance of monetary policy: nominal variables, such as the 
money supply and the price level, are assumed to have no role in explaining fluctuations in 
real variables, such as output and employment13; nevertheless more recent versions of Real 
Business Cycle models take into account capital market imperfections, nominal or real 
rigidities and, lately, the role of banks (see Section 1).  
                                                 
10 The federal funds target rate is instead determined by a meeting of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee which normally 
occurs eight times a year about seven weeks apart. The committee may also hold additional meetings and implement target rate changes 
outside of its normal schedule. The Federal Reserve uses Open market operations to influence the supply of money in the U.S. economy  to 
make the federal funds effective rate follow the federal funds target rate. 
11
 King R. et al. (1991). 
12 Gordon R. J. (2008) 
13
 Mankiw N. G. (1989) 
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This paper tries to add the banks’ capital and assets transmission channel to this 
framework, seeking to assess the influence of these two nominal variables on the real ones.  It 
makes recourse to a Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Model, as this framework allows 
modelling both the long run and the short dynamics among variables and also because it: 
 Treats all variables as endogenous. In particular, capital and assets are endogenous 
with respect to product: an increase in product can have the effect of increasing banks’ 
profits and therefore capital, this in turn can give rise to more loans provision that can 
have effects on product growth;   
 Allows describing their joint behaviour imposing restrictions based on the economic 
theory (in this case the RBC theory). 
The analysis proceeds as follow: 
- first of all the relationship between banks’ assets and capital before and after 1988 is 
analyzed, trying to understand if banks target a constant leverage level since that year; 
- the VECM model is estimated, defining the number and characteristics of the 
contegration vectors according to the economic theory and the results of cointegration 
tests;  
- in order to identify the structural form of the model, long and short run restrictions are 
imposed according to the economic theory and to some reasonable assumptions about 
short and long run parameters.  
Before modelling the VECM, a univariate analysis (not reported) of the time series was 
performed according to the methodology developed by Pelham Box G. E. e Jenkins G. M. 
(1979); it showed that they are all integrated of first order or I(1) 14. 
4.  Is commercial banks’ leverage constant? 
Fig.1 represents aggregate leverage (assets divided by capital) for commercial banks 
and shows a sharp increase until the early eighties and than the convergence around 15 and 
then 10 during the following years. These values are more or less consistent with capital ratios 
                                                 
14 The univariate analysis took into consideration: 
- the total and partial autocorrelograms: for all series the total one slowly decreases to zero starting from a value close to one, while 
the partial one shows that the first order autocorrelations are significantly different to zero and close to one. This behaviour is 
typical of the first order autoregressive series AR(1); 
- the results of an Augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) test, that has been performed including a drift to take into account the 
presence of a linear trend in all series and a time trend in the fed rate series, that shows a quadratic trend, and including the 
number of lags that was suggested case by case by the Schwarz information criterion. In all cases it is not possible to reject the 
null hypothesis of a unit root.  
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between 0.08 and 0.125 (and leverage between 8 and 12), showing that commercial banks 
have substantially targeted a constant leverage ratio since 1988 (or even before, 1984). 
 
Insert Fig. 1 here 
 
 Source: U.S. flows of funds 
As seen in the previous section, assets and capital should be strictly linked by a close 
relationship from the introduction of Basel I in the late eighties, as capital requirements 
essentially imply proportionality between the twos. From an econometric point of view this 
relationship could imply a cointegration relation: both series are non stationary and integrated 
of the first order I(1), but, as they share a long run relationship, their linear combination could 
be stationary (i.e. I(0)). In order to verify this hypothesis a linear regression between the two 
variables has been made, making recourse to OLS estimators: Stock and Watson (1991) in 
fact demonstrated that when two variables are cointegrated, OLS method is super consistent 
as its rate of convergence is T2 rather than just T like in Chebyshev's inequality.  
The regression for the period from the introduction of the first Basel Accord (Basel I) 
1988q1 until 2010q1 underlines the strict positive relationship between the two variables; R-
squared is close to unity and the dependent variable is significantly different from zero (see  
(4.1) and table 1, standard errors in parenthesis).  
 
 
A = 9.03  +   0.75  K        (4.1) 
   (0.22)      (0.01) 
AdjR
2
= 0.98 
 
INSERT  Table n. 1 here 
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To better evaluate the cointegration hypothesis, an Engel and Granger test was 
performed; it is equivalent to an Augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) over regression 
residuals, but shows different critical values, tabled by Engle and Granger (1987)15.    
The value of test statistic is -3.2453, which is smaller then the critical value at 5% 
probability level (-3.17). Therefore its possible to reject the null hypotheses of unit root and 
accept the alternative of stationarity of the residuals of the above regression; i.e. the 
hypothesis of cointegration between banks’ assets and capital. 
In order to verify if a similar relationship was in place before 1988, a robustness check 
was made repeating the same estimates as above but taking into account the period 1973q1, 
1987q4. The regression between assets and capital shows in this case a much less significant 
relationship (see (4.2) and table 2)16. This result seems to offer sufficient evidence against 
cointegration and hence against the constant leverage view in the period before the 
introduction of the first Basel Accord.  
 
A = -2.34  +   1.18  K        (4.2) 
(4.80)      (0.18) 
AdjR
2
= 0.40 
 
INSERT Table n. 2 here 
 
In the end, data evidence seems to prove a cointegration relation between commercial 
banks’ capital and assets starting from 1988, when capital requirements were introduced, but 
not before that date. This result is in favour of the hypothesis that banks respected a constant 
ratio between capital and risk weighted assets or, in other terms, a constant leverage ratio, 
since the introduction of the first Basel accord.  
From an economic point of view, a cointegration relationship between assets and 
capital implies that capital ratio is a binding constraint for banks: they are forced to reduce 
assets in case of capital losses and can instead increase assets when the economic conditions 
are favourable and more capital is available. This behaviour, as described in the previous 
                                                 
15 No drift was included in the test as the plot of the residual series does not show any linear trend; regarding the number of lags to be 
included in the regression, the test takes into account what suggested by the Schwarz information criterion (4 lags). 
16 Furthermore, both the partial and the total residuals auto correlograms (not reported) describe an AR(1) process and the first order 
autocorrelation is very close to one; this could mean that a non stationary process is still present in residuals. 
 14 
section, can have important effects on the real side of the economy amplifying the economic 
cycle and could have been one of the main sources of US expansion until the crisis, but also 
on of the reasons for the subsequent turmoil, when banks abruptly deleveraged.  
5. The transmission channel of banks balance sheets on the real economy: a structural 
vector error correction model -SVECM. 
In the following, the Vector Error Correction Model is estimated for the period 
1988q1- 2007q2, i.e. from the introduction of capital requirements to the very beginning of 
the financial crisis.  The crisis period is not included in the estimates as the aim of paper is to 
understand if capital requirements and the increase in banks’ assets have played a role in the 
increase in real variables registered until the crisis, creating the conditions for the subsequent 
financial instability; besides, considering the crisis period (2007-2010) could introduce non 
linearity in the model and parameters’ instability.  
The  reduced form VECM takes the following form:  
 
ttipitt uyyy +ΓΣ+Π=∆ −= 1,1   
 (5.1)
 
where ( )pik AAI −−−−==Π + ...' 1αβ  ,  α is the loading coefficients matrix  and   β'  is the 
matrix containing the cointegration vectors; yt is the vector of m=7 variables, 
( )
pii AA ++−=Γ + ...1  refers to the short-run parameters, ut is an independent stochastic vector 
of the unobservable error terms with mean zero and non-singular covariance matrix Σu. 
The VECM is obtained from a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model in  levels, that 
takes the following form: 
titipit uyAy +Σ= −= ,1  
(5.2)
 
subtracting yt-1 from both sides and rearranging terms.  
The order of the variables in the VAR is the following: Y, K, F, SP, A, I, C (product, 
consumption, investments, assets and capital for commercial banks, the s&p index, the fed 
fund rate). Before proceeding it is preliminarily necessary to identify the cointegration 
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relations among the 7 variables considered in the analysis, having in mind that one 
cointegration relation has already been proved between capital and assets17. To this end, a 
Johannes cointegration test has been performed among the seven variables; in this test the null 
hypothesis is that the rank of the cointegration matrix  П is r=0,1,2,… against the alternative 
hypothesis. The first row tests r=0 against r>0; the second row tests r=1 against r>1 and so on. 
In the end, the estimates will take into consideration four cointegration relationships as 
suggested by the following Johansen trace test where the hypothesis of rank 3 is rejected in 
favour of rank 418. 
INSERT Table 3 HERE 
 
Therefore matrix П= αβ’ in (1) is rank 4, because of the 4 cointegration relations, 
which are I(0) and represent the long-run equilibrium relations among the variables; the 
whole statistical equilibrium is driven by (m – r) = (7-4) = 3 stochastic trends.  
 To identify the cointegration matrix β’ this paper makes recourse to the theory based 
procedure suggested by Pesaran (1997), imposing that: 
- consumption and investments depend on gross national product, as predicted by the Real 
business cycle theory;  a linear trend variable has also been considered in the consumption 
equation;  
- banks’assets are related to banks’capital, gross national product and a linear trend; 
- the market index depends on product; 
restricting to zero all the other coefficients in the matrix β'. The time lag of the VECM is 2, 
that ensures residual whiteness according to a Lagrange Multiplier test19.  
The choice to introduce the product in the asset equation is in line with some other 
papers where banks’ assets or loan provisioning is modelled20. The long run relationship 
between market indices and product has been proved in other works21, where it is shown that 
the long run relationship between these variables depends on the fact that greater economic 
                                                 
17 The capital series (K)’s seasonality (cfr. Fig.1) has preliminarily been adjusted it by the X11 method.  
18 The cointegration test was also performed taking into account two or three variables by time; it confirmed the results described in the text. 
19 The null hypothesis of the test is serial uncorrelation of residuals; the alternative is that residuals follow a AR(1) process. The value of the 
statistics is LM(49) = 53.3422 and the p-value = 0.3109. If the null Hypothesis is tested against the alternative that residuals follow a AR(4), 
the LM(49) = 51.8228 and its p-value = 0.3643.  
20 See for example Gambacorta L. et al. (2010)  
21 McMillan D.G.(2005)  
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activity (i.e. higher product) leads to a rising stock market through increased future cash 
flows, these in turns increase future dividends. The four cointegration equations are the 
following: 
I      = 1.26 Y           (5. 3) 
(0.016)      
C   = 1.017 Y  +    0.0007 T        (5.4) 
(0.05)       (0.0004) 
A = 3.12 Y  +   1.44  K  -  0.04 T       (5.5) 
 (0.21)     (0.11)     (0.003) 
SP = 2.31 Y              (5.6) 
   (0.12)      
where all coefficients are correctly signed and significant (asymptotic conditional standard 
errors in parentheses). As variables are expressed in terms of logarithms, cointegration 
coefficients represent elasticises. They show that investments, consumption, banks’ assets and 
financial markets strongly react to a change in product as their elasticity is greater than one. 
Consumption shows a positive linear trend, that captures the increase in U.S. 
consumption until the crisis. Banks’ assets show a negative trend: capital ratios, as seen 
before, are expressed as capital over risk weighted assets, this trend can therefore indicate the 
increase in riskiness of assets (the weights) in the period under consideration. 
6. The structural model 
Johansen22 has shown that a vector yt generated by a reduced form VECM, can be 
expressed in the following VMA (Vector Moving Average) form: 
0,1 )()1( yuLCuCy titit +°+Σ= =  
(5.7)
 
where y0  represents the initial conditions of non-stationary variables yt (the hypothesis of a 
finite past is necessary to avoid explosive moments), C(1) contains the permanent 
components and captures the long stochastic trend, while Co (L)= Σj=0, ∞ Cj Lj is an infinite 
order polynomial in the lag operator with coefficient matrices Cj that goes to zero as j tends to 
                                                 
22 Johansen S. (1995). 
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infinity. Co (L) ut represents the transitory components and contains the instantaneous 
coefficients. 
According to the so called AB-model of Amisano and Giannini23, fundamental shocks 
are linearly related to reduced form shocks by the following equation system: 
Ao ut = Bεt 
(5.8) 
Where Ao is the (7 x 7) contemporaneous effect matrix; B is the (7 x 7) structural shocks short 
run response matrix and εt are the structural shocks that have zero mean and identity 
covariance matrix.   
In this paper, it is assumed that the contemporary correlation matrix A0 is an identity 
7*7 matrix (this is known as the B model setup in the Amisano and Giannini framework), 
according to the quite plausible assumption that none of the seven variables immediately react 
to an innovation in the others. Therefore equation system (5.8) becomes:  
 ut = Bεt 
(5.9) 
and the covariance matrix of ut, Σu is equal to BB’. This matrix is not uniquely specified as Σu 
= BB’ represents only ½ m (m+1) = 28 independent equations because of its symmetry. Some 
more ½ m(m-1) = 21 restrictions are necessary for the identification.  
In order to obtain these restrictions and identify the structural shocks hitting the 
system εt It is necessary to switch from the reduced form to the structural representation by 
replacing ut by Bεt: 
 
0,1 )()1( yBLCBCy titi +°+Σ= = εε  
(5.10)
 
The structural shocks εt have a non singular covariance matrix: as a consequence also 
B is non singular.  
                                                 
23 Amisano G. and Giannini C. (1997) 
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C(1)B has rank (m–r) = (7-4) = 3 because C(1) has rank 3 for the presence of 4 
cointegration relations that produces at most 4 columns of zeros in this matrix. The model is 
characterized by r=4 transitory and stationary components and by (m –r)= 3 permanent and 
non-stationary components.  
To identify the structural form 21 restrictions have to be imposed over the matrices C(1)B and 
C
o 
(L) B. 
- r(m-r)= 4(7-4)= 12 restrictions can be derived from the cointegration relationships and are 
added to the long run matrix C(1); they are represented by 4 zero columns in this matrix 
corresponding to the long run answers coming from the transitory components;  
- a number of (m-r)(m-r-1)/2 = (7-4)*(7-5)/2=3 more restriction can be imposed over this 
matrix according to hypotheses coming from the economic theory;  
- other r(r −1)/2= 6 restrictions will be imposed on the contemporary relation matrix B 
according to feasible assumptions.  
The restrictions imposed over the long run matrix C(1) are the following: 
- the product series does not respond to any shock coming from the other variables apart from 
its own shock (the technological shock); these hypotheses are consistent with the Real 
Business Cycle theory and its theoretical presumption that only supply shocks have 
permanent effects on productivity. They also reflect the idea that money is neutral in the 
long run, as also the fed fund rate does not influence the product (c13=0). These restrictions 
give rise to zeros in the first row of the matrix, apart from the first element; 
- the fed rate does not affect banks’ capital in the long run (c23=0),. This assumption, together 
with the hypothesis that the fed rate does not affect the product described above complete 
the hypothesis of neutrality of money in the long run as they imply that the effective federal 
fund rate affects neither of the other permanent components, i.e. the variables that “drive” 
the system in the long run (product and banks’ capital). As a consequence, no other variable 
is influenced by the policy rate in the long run. 
According to these restrictions the C(1) matrix will be: 
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C(1) = 






















0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
00000
000000
737271
636261
535251
434241
323131
2221
11
ccc
ccc
ccc
ccc
ccc
cc
c
 
(5.11) 
Regarding the B matrix, it has been restricted making recourse to feasible assumptions for 
the short run: i.e. supposing that consumption and investments do not immediately influence 
banks’ capital and the market index (b25, b27, b46, b47=0) and that a shock to investments does 
not immediately influence the fed rate (b36=0). Another important short run assumption is that 
banks’ assets do not immediately influence product (b15=0). This restriction relies on the idea 
that: 
- banks require some time before providing a new loan; 
- it takes some times before households and firms employ the funds received with loans 
and their expenditure has real effects. 
 
Under these hypotheses, the equation system (5.9) becomes:  
 



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
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
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(5.12) 
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6.1. Structural VECM Analysis: Impulse Response Functions 
Having estimated the Structural Cointegrated VAR model, it is possible to obtain the 
impulse response functions (IRFs) provided by the Vector moving average representation. 
They describe the response of each variable to a shock coming from another one s period 
before. Aim of this paper is to verify if, after a positive (or negative) shock over capital: 
- banks are induced to increase (decrease) assets, expanding (reducing) loans and the purchase 
of securities, but keeping on targeting a fixed ratio between capital and assets;  
- the increase (decrease) in assets (loans and securities) to household and firms let 
consumption and investments rise (diminish) and bonds’ and stocks’ prices increase. 
The IRFs obtained cover 40 quarters afterwards the occurring of the shock. 
Regarding real variables, as expected, the s&p500, investments, product and 
consumption, as well as, positively react to a shock in product (s1) that testify the importance 
of the technological innovation over growth (Fig. 2 to 5).  
Impulse Response Functions to a shock to product (s1) 
INSERT FIG. 2 TO 5  HERE 
 
 A positive shock (one b.p.) to banks’ capital (s2) produces a permanent and significant 
increase in banks’ assets while an increase in assets produces a (not very long lasting) 
increase in capital (Fig. 6 and  7). 
Impulse Response Functions to a shock to banks’ capital (s2) 
INSERT FIG. 6 AND 7  HERE 
 
A positive shock to banks assets (s5) does not produce a significant response in the other 
series (Fig.8 to 10)24. 
 
Impulse Response Functions to a shock to banks’ assets (s5) 
INSERT FIG. 8 TO 11  HERE 
 
                                                 
24 This result is consistent with some recent studies about the effect of the new capital requirements, defined by the Basel Committe after the 
financial crisis, over real economy. They show that each percentage point increase in the capital ratio causes a very small decline (median 
0.09 percent) in the level of steady state output, relative to the baseline. See Angelini  P. et. al. (2011). 
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Moreover an increase in banks assets should give rise to a positive response in financial 
markets; but even in this case the Fig. 11 shows a response that is not significantly different 
from zero25. Even the response of product to a shock in the fed fund rate (not reported) appears 
not significant. This result would suggest that the stance of monetary policy was not 
determinant for the growth in the period under consideration, contradicting the common view 
that it significantly contributed to the Great Moderation.  
This result would suggest that the stance of monetary policy was not determinant for the 
growth in the period under consideration, contradicting the common view that it significantly 
contributed to the U.S. expansion26.  
Fig.12-Response Function of the product (Y) to a shock to the fed fund rate (s3) 
INSERT FIG. 12   HERE 
 
    
In the end the results of the estimates seem to confirm that the U.S. growth in the period 
under consideration was essentially due to the technological innovation, as widely recognized. 
Commercial banks assets expansion does not seem to have played a fundamental role in the 
period under consideration. 
Conclusions 
The paper concentrates on the role of U.S. commercial banks assets over U.S. expansion 
until the financial crisis. Banks – especially US banks – have been blamed of the excessive 
increase of assets and credit that created the conditions for the subsequent turmoil. 
Nevertheless, banks’ leverage increase should be limited by the amount of available capital 
and by the need to guarantee a fixed ratio between capital and assets, as stated by banking 
regulation. In particular, from the introduction of the first Basel Accord, the ratio of a bank's 
capital to its risk-weighted assets (the total capital ratio) must be no lower than 8% (weights 
reflect the presumed degree of risks associated to that kind of assets).  
The paper tries to analyze the interrelation between real and U.S. banks balance sheet 
variables, attempting to answer to the following questions: was the capital requirements’ 
constraint really binding for the US commercial banks? Did the increase in banks’ assets 
                                                 
25 To better evaluate the short run effect of banks’assets over product, I have also tried a different specification of the model relaxing the 
assumption that the short run response of product to assets is zero and substituting it with the assumption that the market index does not 
affect the product in the short run. Even with this different specification, the IFR does not show a significant effect of assets over product. 
26 See Brunnermeier M.K. et al.(2008) 
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significantly contribute to US expansion in the real sector and in the financial markets until 
the crisis?  
In order to answer to these questions commercial banks behaviour has been analyzed 
through an empirical methodology, making recourse to a CVAR. It appears clear that 
banks’assets and capital are closely linked by a long run relationship since 1988, when the 
first capital accord Basel I essentially imposed a fixed leverage ratio for commercial banks; 
the analysis also shows that an increase in capital produces a corresponding increase in assets 
in the long run. This result seems to confirm that commercial banks actively manage their 
assets on the basis of their capital position in order to respect capital requirements, as 
suggested by some recent studies.  
This behaviour should produce an increase in lending when surplus capital is available 
and enforce the downturn phases because of the abrupt deleveraging from banks. 
Nevertheless, according to the estimates, in the period before the crisis the observed increase 
in banks assets does not seem to have produced a significant impact over product; this results 
is in line with previous studies, conducted without modelling the capital - asset relationship 
(Berrospide et al., 2010).  
The analysis confirms that most of the growth can instead be explained with the rise in 
productivity given by the technological shocks. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that deep changes took place in the financial sector 
(especially in the U.S.) in the period under consideration, as new securitization techniques 
were developed and securitized assets (i.e. securities backed by loans) grew exponentially. 
These innovations allowed financial institutions other than banks (like investment banks, 
broker-dealers, mutual and hedge funds) to take part to the credit intermediation process, 
because they were among the main buyers of securitized assets27. 
Over time the development of the non banking intermediation also reduced the relative 
importance of commercial banks over the U.S. financial system. In 1988, the ratio between 
commercial banks’ credit market assets and the total credit market assets held by the domestic 
financial sector decreased from 36% in 1980 to 24% in 2007; conversely credit market assets 
held by the other intermediaries rose from 64 to 75%28.  Furthermore, according to the 
                                                 
27 See Pozsar Z. et al. (2012). 
28 These percentage has been calculated making recourse to the Flows of funds, http://www.federalreserve.gov. Domestic financial system 
includes Abs issuers,  GSE - backed mortgage pools, broker dealers, Bank Holding Companies, Banks in U.S.-Affiliated Areas, Foreign 
Banking Offices in U.S., U.S.-Chartered Commercial Banks,  closed-End Funds, credit unions, Exchange-Traded Funds, Federal 
Government Retirement Funds, Finance Companies, funding Corporations, Government-Sponsored Enterprises, Life Insurance Companies, 
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Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) global CDO29 issuance rose 
from 78 billions of dollars in 2001 to 520 in 2006, abruptly declining to a bit more then 4 
billions in 2009 (see SIFMA web site); securitisation in general registered an estimated 
outstanding of $10.24 trillion in the United States and $2.25 trillion in Europe as of the 2nd 
quarter of 200830.  
In the end, non banking intermediation entered in the credit supply chain and 
participated to the increase in the financial system leverage. Further work could try to 
evaluate the contribution of non banking intermediation to the U.S. growth in the period 
before the crisis but also to the subsequent turmoil. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Monetary Authority, Mutual Funds, Money Market Mutual Funds, Casualty Insurance Companies, Private Pension Funds, REITs, Savings 
Institutions. 
29 CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) were probably the most complex type of securitized instruments; a kind of security backed by other 
types of securitized securities, by CDSs (Credit default swaps) or other CDOs (so called CDO square).   
30 "ESF Securitisation Data Report Q2:2008” (2008), European Securitisation Forum, London, Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA). 
 24 
References 
Adrian T., and Shin H. S., (2009) The shadow banking system: implications for financial 
regulation Banque de France FSR, no. 13 sept.. 
Adrian, T., and Shin H.S., (2010) Liquidity and Leverage, Journal of financial 
intermediation. 
Amisano G., and Giannini C. (2005), Topics in STructural VAR Econometrics, 2nd ed. 
Sringer, Berlin. 
Angelini P. et. al. (2011) BASEL III: Long-term impact on economic performance and 
fluctuations, Banca d’Italia Occasional paper n. 87. 
Baglioni A., Boitani A., and Monticini A., (2010), Is the Leverage of European Commercial 
Banks Pro-Cyclical?, ISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università 
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 
Banca D’Italia, (2009) Financial sector pro-cyclicality: lessons from the crisis, Occasional 
paper n.44. 
Bernanke B., and Gertler M. (1989), Agency costs, collateral, and business fluctuations 
American Economic Review.  
Berrospide J., and Edge R., (2010) The effects of bank capital on lending: what do we know, 
and what does it mean? Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Divisions of Research & 
Statistics and Monetary Affairs Federal Reserve Board, Washington, June 17,. 
Blanchard O., and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) G.M., Global Imbalances: In Midstream?, IMF Staff 
Position Note, SPN 09/29. 
Blanchard, O.J., and D. Quah, (1989) The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand and Supply 
Disturbances, American Economic Review 79, 655-673. 
Boeri T., and Guiso L.,(2009) The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century A 
VoxEU.org Publication. 
Bolton P., Freixas X., and Shapiro J., (2007) Conflicts of interest, information provision, and 
competition in the financial services industry, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 85, 
Issue 2, p.297–330. 
Boot A., (2000) Relationship Banking: What Do We Know? Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, n. 9, p. 7–25. 
 25 
Brunnermeier M.K., (2008) Deciphering the 2007-08 Liquidity and credit crunch, Journal of 
Economic perspectives. 
Brunnermeier M.K., and Pedersen L. (2008) Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, The 
Review of financial studies. 
Calomiris C. W., (2007) Not (Yet) a ‘Minsky Moment, mimeo. 
Ciccarone G.,Giuli F., and Liberati D., (2012) The effects of monetary policy shocks in credit 
and labor markets with search and matching frictions Working paper n.151, Dipartimento di 
Economia Pubblica, Università la Sapienza di Roma. 
Clarida R., Galí Y., and Gertler M., (1999) The Science of Monetary Policy: A New 
Keynesian Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 37, December. 
Colander, D., Föllmer, H., Haas, A., Goldberg, M., Juselius, and K., Kirmen, (2009) A., Lux, 
T., & Slot, B. The financial crisis and the systematic failure of Academic economics, 
Working paper No. 1489,  Kiel Institute for the World Economy. 
Engle R. F., and Granger C. W. J., (1987) Co-integration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation and Testing, Econometrica, Vol. 55, N. 2 pp. 521-276. 
Fisher I., The debt deflation theory of great depression, Econometrica, 1933. 
Gambacorta L., and Rossi C., (2010) Modelling bank lending in the euro area: a nonlinear 
approach, Applied Financial Economics, No. 20, 1099–1112. 
Gerali A., Neri S., Sessa L., and Signoretti F.M, (2010) Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model 
of the Euro Area, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Volume 42, Issue Supplement s1, 
pages 107–141, September. 
Gordon R. J., (2008) The Slowest Potential Output Growth in U. S. History: Measurement 
and Interpretation, Northwestern University and NBER, mimeo. 
Gregory M.N., (1989) The Real Business Cycles: A New Keynesian Perspective, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives,  Vol. 3, No.3, pp. 79-90. 
Iacoviello M., (2005) House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the 
Business Cycle, American Economic Review. 
Johansen S. (1995), Likelihood Based Inference on Cointegration in the Vector 
Autoregressive Model, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 26 
Kiff J., and  Mills P., (2007) Money for nothing and checks for free, IMF Working Paper 
n.188. 
King R., Plosser C., Stock J.,and Watson M., (1991) Stochastic trends and economic 
fluctuations. American Economic Review, vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 819-40. 
Kiyotaki N., and Moore J., (1997) Credit Cycles, Journal of Political Economy. 
McMillan D. G., (2005) 'Time variation in the cointegrating relationship between stock prices 
and economic activity', International Review of Applied Economics, No. 19: 3, p. 359 — 368. 
Minsky H.P, (1957) Central Banking and Money Market Changes, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 
Minsky H.P, (1991) Financial Crises: Systemic or Idiosyncratic, The Jerome Levy Economics 
Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 51. 
Minsky H.P,  (1975) John Maynard Keynes. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Minsky H.P,  (1969) Private Sector Asset Management and the Effectiveness of Monetary 
Policy: Theory and Practice, The Journal of Finance. 
Minsky H.P, (1992)  The Capital Development of the Economy and The Structure of 
Financial Institutions, The Jeromc Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper 
No. 72. 
Minsky H.P, (1996)  Uncertainty and the institutional structure of the capitalist economies  
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 155. 
Minsky H.P, (1992) Can It Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance, Armonk, N.Y., 
M. E. Sharpe. 
Minsky H.P, (1992) Reconstituting the United States’ Financial Structure: Some Fundamental 
Issues. The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 69. 
Minsky H.P, (1986) Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press. 
Minsky H.P, (1992) The Financial Instability Hypothesis. Working Paper No.74. The Levy 
Economics Institute.May. 
Pelham Box G.E.and Jenkins G.M., (1979) Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control, 
Holden-Day. 
 27 
Pesaran M.H., (1997) The Role of Economic Theory in Modelling the Long Run, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 107, No. 440, Jan., pp. 178-191. 
Pozsar Z., Adrian T., Ashcraft A., and Boesky H., (2012) Shadow banking, Federal reserve 
Bank of New York Staff Report No.458. 
Spencer D., speech by (2009), 2009: A review of the economic year, Bank of England, 
September. 
Stock, J., and  Watson M., (1991) A Simple Estimator of Cointegrating Vectors in Higher 
Order Integrated Systems, Econometrica, v.61 n.4. 
Whalen C. J., (2007) The U.S. Credit crunch of 2007 A Minsky Moment, The Levy economic 
Institute of Bard College, Research report n. 92.  
 28 
 
Fig. 1 
Leverage in the US Commercial banks 
(Assets divided by capital) 
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Source: U.S. Flows of funds 
 
 
 
 
 
Table n. 1 – Regression between banks’ assets and capital – 1988q1, 2010q2 
                                                                              
       _cons     9.031018    .220407    40.97   0.000     8.592935    9.469101
           K     .7552086   .0082016    92.08   0.000     .7389069    .7715102
                                                                              
           A        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    17.7094507    88  .201243758           Root MSE      =  .04547
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9897
    Residual    .179869544    87  .002067466           R-squared     =  0.9898
       Model    17.5295812     1  17.5295812           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,    87) = 8478.78
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      89
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Table n. 2 – Regression between banks’ assets and capital – 1973q1, 1987q4 
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.337639   4.797299    -0.49   0.628    -11.94048    7.265198
           K     1.186572   .1876788     6.32   0.000     .8108921    1.562252
                                                                              
           A        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    9.92125693    59  .168156897           Root MSE      =  .31822
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3978
    Residual    5.87343226    58  .101266073           R-squared     =  0.4080
       Model    4.04782467     1  4.04782467           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,    58) =   39.97
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      60
 
 
 
Table n. 3. Johansen cointegration test 
H0 H1 Eigenvalues 
90% critical 
value Trace test 
     
r=0 r≥0 0.5146 144.87 191.7914 
r=1 r≥1 0.3828 112.65 136.8669 
r=2 r≥2 0.3444 84.38 100.189 
r=3 r≥3 0.3266 60.09 68.1047 
r=4 r≥4 0.2298 39.75 38.0484 
r=5 r≥5 0.1517 23.32 18.2094 
r=6 r≥6 0.0724 10.67 5.7088 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 - Response function of SP    Fig. 3 - Response function of I 
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Fig. 4 Response function of Y    Fig. 5 Response function of C 
 
Fig. 6 Response function of A   Fig. 7 Response function of K 
 
 
Fig. 8 Response function of C    Fig.9 Response function of Y 
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Fig.10  Response function of I   Fig.11 Response function of SP 
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Fig.12-Response Function of the product (Y) to a shock to the fed fund rate (s3) 
 
 
 
